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Abstract
How did the great financial crisis (GFC) of 2008–2010 impact on R&D and innovation in the 
United Kingdom and internationally? What can we learn about the likely innovation effects of the 
COVID-19 crisis on small and medium enterprises (SME) innovation? Numerous international 
studies suggest the strong procyclicality of R&D and innovation investments in firms: investment 
rises in recovery and falls sharply in times of crisis. This procyclicality is driven in firms by both 
internal financial resources or slack and varying market incentives for innovation. Cash constraints, 
in particular, may impact most strongly on R&D and innovation investments by smaller firms. In 
the United Kingdom, the proportion of innovating firms fell by around a third during the GFC and 
took around four to six years to recover. Recovery was also uneven – notably weaker in some 
sectors and regions. The COVID-19 crisis seems likely to leave many firms financially weaker, with 
the most significant impacts on the willingness or ability of SMEs to sustain R&D and innovation. 
Where firms are able to sustain these investments, however, the evidence from the GFC suggests 
that they will lead to better survival chances, stronger growth and higher profitability. Some 
additional financial support for innovation has been announced by the UK government. Whether 
this will be sufficient to sustain SME levels of innovative activity, however, remains to be seen.
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Introduction
Innovation – the introduction of new products, services and ways of doing business – will be a 
critical element of the recovery post-COVID-19. Undertaking R&D and innovation is always 
risky, however, with uncertain technical and commercial outcomes. In a recent review of the 
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literature on innovation failure, Rhaiem and Amara (2019) estimate the proportion of innovative 
projects failing, wholly or in part, to be between 40% and 90%. As we move beyond the immediate 
COVID crisis, firms with less financial slack may be less willing to make such risky investments. 
Weak market demand, and potentially volatility, may also reduce the incentives to innovate. Here, 
we look back at the aftermath of the great financial crisis (GFC) of 2008–2010 and examine how 
it affected R&D and innovation in the United Kingdom and internationally, with a particular focus 
on the implication for small and medium enterprises (SMEs). We then consider what implications 
this has for R&D and innovation in SMEs in the United Kingdom in years to come. The argument 
develops as follows. In section ‘Innovation after the GFC – credit constraints, procyclicality and a 
lack of demand’, we provide an overview of the international research literature on the effects of 
the GFC on R&D and innovation. Few of these studies relate specifically to SMEs but they do 
provide an indication of how financial pressures and changes in markets impacted on the behav-
iours of firms more generally. Section ‘UK innovation trends after the GFC – a slow recovery’ 
focuses more specifically on the United Kingdom and uses data from the UK Innovation Survey 
(UKIS) and Business R&D surveys to examine some of the main trends in innovation activity after 
the GFC. Section ‘R&D and innovation after COVID-19’ summarises the key lessons and consid-
ers what we can infer about R&D and innovation in SMEs post-COVID-19.
Innovation after the GFC – credit constraints, procyclicality and a 
lack of demand
The GFC had significant and lasting effects on the global economy. It limited access to finance 
for many smaller firms internationally and reduced growth rates and the incentives for innova-
tion. In this section we consider how R&D and innovation behaviour changed during, and after 
the GFC, drawing on international research evidence. We focus on the empirical evidence, but it 
is worth noting that theoretical arguments exist, which could explain both countercyclical and 
procyclical R&D and innovation investments. Schumpeterian growth models imply counter-
cyclical R&D investment over the business cycle (Aghion et al., 2012), with economic crises 
creating the conditions for new innovation by lowering factor prices and creating a stock of idle 
resources (Schumpeter, 1934). The central argument here is one of ‘creative destruction’ where, 
during times of recession, there is a reallocation of resources towards new entrants (Aghion 
et al., 2014). Conversely, if access to credit in order to finance innovative activities becomes 
limited during a recession, firms may become cash constrained, and R&D investment becomes 
procyclical (Aghion et al., 2012). For example, using US firm-level data on non-federally 
funded, high-technology firms, Kabukcuoglu (2019) examines the cyclicality of R&D activities. 
Findings suggest that R&D investment is procyclical due to binding financial constraints. Sub-
sample results for small firms and young firms – firms that may be more likely to face financial 
constraints – support the main findings. Furthermore, findings indicate that R&D stocks of the 
median firm without access to bond markets could have increased by a further five percentage 
points if liquidity constraints were removed (see also Burger et al., 2017). In another empirical 
study, Paunov (2012) uses regression analysis to examine the role of financial constraints in 
determining innovative investments in Latin America. Findings show that private investments in 
innovation are largely procyclical. On average, one in four firms engaged in less innovative 
investment during the GFC.
The data indicate that during the crisis, larger firms were stronger process innovators than 
smaller firms, whereas the proportion of larger and smaller firms undertaking product innovation 
during the crisis was similar. Essentially similar results emphasising the impact of financial con-
straints and the procyclicality of R&D and innovation investments are found by Campello et al. 
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(2010) in a survey of senior managers across 39 countries and by López-García et al. (2013) in a 
more focused examination of the impact of credit constraints on 3200 Spanish firms. In Campello 
et al. (2010), a higher proportion of small firms, compared to large firms, said that they were ‘very 
affected’ by financial constraints during the crisis, and a higher proportion of the latter stating they 
were ‘not affected’. The proportion of firms indicating that they were ‘somewhat affected’ by 
financial constraints was similar across the two subgroups. Many of these studies suggest that 
procyclical R&D and innovation investment during the GFC is the result of the credit constraints 
that existed at the time. Adopting an alternative approach, Argente et al. (2018) investigate changes 
in innovation outcomes – the extent of product innovation and reallocation – in the US consumer 
goods sector during the 2007–2013 period. Findings suggest that during the GFC, product realloca-
tion was strongly procyclical; the quarterly reallocation rate declined by more than 25%, with the 
majority of this reduction occurring within firms and resulting from a decline in the creation of new 
products during the recession. In addition, the rate of product reallocation was strongly related to 
the innovation efforts of firms, and those firms that had higher reallocation rates grew faster, pro-
duced higher quality goods and experienced increases in productivity.
The cyclicality of R&D spending during the GFC is often examined without any consideration 
of firm heterogeneity. Schmitz (2014), however, investigates whether small-firm and large-firm 
R&D-investment responses differ during times of recession. Using data on German firms, Schmitz 
(2014) finds that the median small firm reduced its R&D spending by more than the median large 
firm. This resulted in the development of a significant gap in the relative R&D intensity of small 
and large firms during the GFC years.
UK innovation trends after the GFC – a slow recovery1
There has been limited prior work on the impact of the GFC on R&D and innovation in the United 
Kingdom. In this section we, therefore, draw upon survey data to provide an overview of trends in 
innovation during and after the GFC. The UKIS is the primary source of data on innovation in UK 
firms (with more than 10 employees) and is conducted every two years.2 Each wave of the survey 
relates to innovation activity in the previous three years. One wave covered the period 2008–2010, 
the great recession period, with the previous wave covering the pre-recession 2006–2008 period. 
Subsequent waves of the survey provide an overview of the post-crisis behaviour. This survey 
provides three indicators relating to the extent of innovation activity across the population of UK 
firms: the percentage of innovation-active firms (Table 1), the percentage of product/service inno-
vators (Table 2) and the percentage of process innovators (Table 3). The initial columns in each 
table provide the percentage of firms undertaking each activity, and the later columns provide an 
indexed form of the data using the recession period 2008–2010 as the baseline (2008–2010 = 100). 
Green cells represent above recession level and the red cells below recession levels. In terms of 
these innovation metrics the UKIS suggests the following:
•• The percentage of innovation-active firms (Table 1 and Figure 1) – those either innovating 
or investing in innovation – fell sharply from 2006 to 2008 (58.2%) to the recession period 
(36.8%). In 2014–2016 aggregate levels of innovation activity on this metric had not recov-
ered their pre-recession levels (49.0%). This was true of almost all sectors and regions, as 
well as smaller firms. By 2014–2016, levels of innovation activity in larger firms were 
marginally above that in the pre-recession period (Table 1). The recovery in innovation 
levels post-recession was slower in manufacturing than in services (Table 1). Levels of 
innovation activity in the primary sector and North-east remained particularly weak through-
out the post-recession period until 2014–2016 (Table 1).
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Table 1. Percentage of innovation-active firms.

























57.3 35.4 43.1 52.0 47.3 161.9 100.0 121.9 147.1 133.9
S/M (50–99) 62.5 42.1 50.4 57.9 53.8 100.0 119.6 137.4 127.7
Medium
(100–249)
46.4 50.7 54.5 58.9 100.0 109.2 117.4 126.9
Large
(250+)
61.2 42.7 50.4 61.3 63.1 143.4 100.0 118.0 143.7 147.9
B. Region
North-east 59.5 40.0 46.6 52.8 42.0 148.7 100.0 116.5 132.1 104.9
North-west 56.3 32.2 41.8 52.6 48.7 175.0 100.0 130.0 163.6 151.5
Yorkshire and The Humber 60.7 35.6 43.0 64.7 49.3 170.6 100.0 120.8 181.8 138.5
East Midlands 55.5 38.9 48.8 56.3 51.6 142.6 100.0 125.3 144.6 132.4
West Midlands 58.7 38.0 43.4 55.0 52.0 154.3 100.0 114.0 144.6 136.6
East of England 59.1 41.2 46.0 56.4 51.6 143.4 100.0 111.6 136.9 125.2
London 55.8 32.8 42.2 48.0 46.9 170.1 100.0 128.7 146.4 143.0
South-east 63.3 41.2 45.8 56.9 51.1 153.8 100.0 111.2 138.2 124.3
South-west 57.8 38.3 47.2 43.4 52.5 150.9 100.0 123.3 113.3 137.0
Wales 58.6 40.6 46.6 50.8 46.5 144.2 100.0 114.8 124.9 114.4
Scotland 54.8 33.3 43.3 50.4 45.0 164.3 100.0 129.8 151.2 134.9
Northern Ireland 54.8 31.8 39.4 44.7 38.8 172.3 100.0 123.9 140.7 122.1
C. Technology
High-tech manufacturing 53.1 58.4 65.7 67.5 100.0 110.1 123.8 127.1
Low-tech manufacturing 46.7 52.6 62.9 56.9 100.0 112.6 134.6 121.9
Other industries 34.1 42.2 50.8 46.9 100.0 124.0 149.1 137.5
D. Main sector
Primary sector 52.4 41.1 47.1 43.2 100.0 78.4 89.8 82.4
Engineering-based 
manufacturing
58.6 60.8 71.0 72.6 100.0 103.7 121.1 123.8
Other manufacturing 45.2 52.7 62.3 57.0 100.0 116.7 137.9 126.2
Construction 30.6 41.2 45.8 44.2 100.0 134.8 149.7 144.7
Retail & distribution 35.4 42.2 51.3 48.2 100.0 119.3 145.1 136.2
Knowledge intensive services 45.7 52.0 64.6 65.6 100.0 113.8 141.3 143.6
Other services 31.5 40.3 48.6 42.6 100.0 128.1 154.6 135.4
Source: Statistical Annexes for the UK Innovation Surveys, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015 and 2017.
Note I. Red shading indicates levels below the recessionary period, yellow at recessionary levels and green above the 
recession period. S/M: small/medium.
Note II. Please refer to the online version of the article to view the table in colour.
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Table 2. Product/service innovators: percentage of firms.

























23.0 18.0 17.2 18.4 23.1 127.9 100.0 95.6 102.5 128.6
S/M (50–99) 28.5 21.5 20.8 21.4 26.4 100.0 96.6 99.4 122.9
Medium
(100–249)
25.1 22.7 23.2 25.7 100.0 90.3 92.3 102.6
Large
(250+)
31.5 23.7 23.5 26.8 29.3 132.7 100.0 99.2 112.9 123.4
B. Region
North-east 21.0 21.2 19.2 16.4 20.1 98.9 100.0 90.3 77.2 94.5
North-west 22.7 18.2 18.9 15.9 23.0 124.5 100.0 103.6 87.1 125.9
Yorkshire and The Humber 24.1 18.0 15.6 25.3 24.0 133.9 100.0 86.5 140.6 133.2
East Midlands 24.5 21.4 19.8 23.8 26.7 114.4 100.0 92.2 111.0 124.6
West Midlands 25.1 18.6 17.0 21.9 26.0 135.0 100.0 91.4 117.8 140.0
East of England 23.6 20.8 17.3 20.2 25.7 113.6 100.0 83.3 97.3 123.6
London 22.9 17.0 17.2 19.1 21.5 134.6 100.0 101.4 112.1 126.6
South-east 27.8 21.8 20.1 17.1 26.5 127.3 100.0 92.1 78.4 121.4
South-west 25.6 19.4 19.8 15.1 25.3 132.1 100.0 102.3 77.7 130.4
Wales 24.4 20.1 17.9 21.3 21.0 121.4 100.0 88.8 105.8 104.2
Scotland 21.3 15.2 16.1 19.8 20.5 139.9 100.0 105.9 130.2 134.5
Northern Ireland 16.8 13.0 14.6 13.6 17.3 129.1 100.0 111.9 104.4 133.3
C. Technology
High-tech manufacturing 37.6 35.2 33.7 39.3 100.0 93.7 89.6 104.6
Low-tech manufacturing 28.9 25.5 29.9 29.0 100.0 88.0 103.3 100.2
Other industries 15.9 15.7 16.8 22.1 100.0 98.7 105.6 139.0
D. Main sector
Primary sector 23.3 20.9 14.8 13.1 100.0 89.6 63.4 56.0
Engineering-based 
manufacturing
43.6 39.8 43.8 46.0 100.0 91.1 100.3 105.4
Other manufacturing 27.4 25.3 28.5 28.6 100.0 92.5 104.1 104.5
Construction 9.6 10.7 13.0 18.7 100.0 111.2 136.2 194.9
Retail & distribution 17.0 15.7 16.0 23.9 100.0 92.5 94.0 140.4
Knowledge intensive services 30.3 28.7 31.5 39.1 100.0 94.9 104.2 129.0
Other services 13.9 13.8 14.8 18.3 100.0 99.6 106.5 132.4
Source: Statistical Annexes for the UK Innovation Surveys, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015 and 2017.
Note I. Red shading indicates levels below the recessionary period, yellow at recessionary levels and green above the 
recession period. S/M: small/medium.
Note II. Please refer to the online version of the article to view the table in colour.
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Table 3. Process innovators: percentage of firms.

























12.0 9.6 9.4 11.9 14.9 125.6 100.0 98.6 125.0 155.5
S/M (50–99) 15.4 10.7 14.0 15.8 19.0 100.0 130.0 147.2 177.2
Medium
(100–249)
16.0 15.1 16.4 21.8 100.0 94.8 102.7 136.3
Large
(250+)
18.9 17.6 15.4 20.2 22.5 107.4 100.0 87.5 114.7 128.2
B. Region
North-east 11.7 12.9 9.5 13.6 10.5 90.7 100.0 73.7 105.6 81.5
North-west 10.6 9.5 11.6 12.7 16.9 112.0 100.0 122.1 134.1 178.1
Yorkshire and The Humber 13.1 10.3 9.8 12.1 18.7 126.7 100.0 95.1 116.7 180.6
East Midlands 11.9 10.8 11.0 13.1 19.3 110.1 100.0 101.6 121.4 178.6
West Midlands 12.9 10.8 10.2 16.1 17.1 119.2 100.0 94.0 149.2 157.9
East of England 13.7 12.7 10.5 12.5 15.1 108.2 100.0 83.0 98.5 118.9
London 13.2 8.8 10.2 9.5 14.4 150.2 100.0 116.3 107.6 163.7
South-east 14.2 11.9 10.8 16.9 16.4 119.6 100.0 90.8 142.5 138.4
South-west 11.2 9.5 12.3 10.4 15.7 118.5 100.0 130.0 109.7 165.9
Wales 13.1 11.5 9.0 13.8 15.0 113.8 100.0 78.4 119.4 130.7
Scotland 12.5 8.1 7.2 12.5 14.5 154.0 100.0 89.1 153.9 178.4
Northern Ireland 10.6 6.9 8.4 9.2 10.3 153.1 100.0 121.8 133.4 148.1
C. Technology
High-tech manufacturing 19.4 15.8 20.5 24.2 100.0 81.7 106.0 124.9
Low-tech manufacturing 17.9 18.0 21.1 23.7 100.0 100.5 118.1 132.7
Other industries 8.4 8.9 11.1 14.3 100.0 105.1 132.3 169.8
D. Main sector
Primary sector 17.2 12.0 18.9 14.0 100.0 69.7 110.0 81.4
Engineering-based 
manufacturing
22.3 18.0 25.9 26.4 100.0 80.4 116.1 118.3
Other manufacturing 17.1 17.0 20.6 23.6 100.0 99.4 120.6 137.7
Construction 6.8 5.3 8.7 14.6 100.0 77.1 127.2 213.8
Retail & distribution 8.0 7.6 10.7 14.5 100.0 94.9 133.4 180.1
Knowledge intensive services 16.7 16.4 20.9 22.8 100.0 98.1 125.1 136.0
Other services 7.0 8.6 9.3 12.2 100.0 122.3 132.4 174.2
Source: Statistical Annexes for the UK Innovation Surveys, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015 and 2017.
Note I. Red shading indicates levels below the recessionary period, yellow at recessionary levels and green above the 
recession period. S/M: small/medium.
Note II. Please refer to the online version of the article to view the table in colour.
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•• Around 1:5 UK firms report product or service innovation over a three-year period (Table 
2). The proportion fell by 26.6% to the recession (Figure 1) and had only recovered this 
level of activity by 2014–2016, six years after the recession. In part, this reflects a continued 
fall in the proportion of innovating firms in the years immediately following the recession 
(Table 2). This post-recession fall was evident in all sizes of firms with innovation recover-
ing most quickly in larger and small (10–49 employees) firms. A number of regions also 
experienced further falls in levels of product/service innovation after the recession with the 
picture in the North-east and the Primary sector being particularly weak (Table 2).
•• Process innovation is typically reported by around 1:6 UK firms (Table 3 and Figure 1). 
Levels of process innovation activity dropped by around a fifth between 2006–2008 and 
2008–2010 and recovered steadily thereafter. By 2014–2016, activity levels were well 
above their pre-recession level. In this sense, process innovation rebounded significantly 
more quickly than product or service innovation. Process innovation increased more rapidly 
in smaller firms post-recession, and by 2014–2016, levels of activity were higher than the 
pre-recession level in most sectors and regions. The primary sector and the North-east are 
again notable exceptions (Table 3).
R&D and innovation after COVID-19
The COVID-19 crisis shares two significant similarities to the 2008–2010 GFC. First, both were, 
or are sharp exogenous shocks rather than business-cycle fluctuations. Second, both have affected 
firms through sharply reduced liquidity – the GFC through a sharp reduction in the availability of 
commercial finance and the COVID-19 crisis through sharply reduced turnover. In both cases, 
financial stringency will force firms to make rapid strategic decisions about areas of spend and 
potential savings. The evidence from the international research literature and UK trends post the 
Figure 1. The percentage of innovating firms in the United Kingdom.
Source: Statistical Annexes for the UK Innovation Surveys, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015 and 2017.
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GFC suggests that R&D and innovation are strongly procyclical, and we should, therefore, expect 
sharp falls (perhaps a third) in the proportion of innovating firms, with only a slow recovery to 
previous levels of innovative activity.
These effects will not be uniform across firms. The evidence from the GFC suggests that firms 
which entered the COVID-19 crisis with stronger cash positions may also emerge more strongly. 
For example, Joseph et al. (2020) use firm-level data for private and publicly listed UK firms dur-
ing the 1999–2014 period to investigate whether a firm’s pre-crisis cash position relative to its 
industry rivals is a strong predictor of the firm’s long-term investment after the financial crisis. 
Findings suggest that the tightening of credit constraints during the crisis allowed cash-rich firms 
to gain a strategic advantage over financially constrained rivals. The impact of relative cash was 
particularly large for young and small firms – those firms more likely to become financially con-
strained during a crisis. In addition, cash-investment sensitivities were larger for firms operating in 
industries where the average firm was younger or smaller. Continuing to invest during the crisis 
gave the cash-rich firms a competitive edge that would continue into the recovery period. Having 
financial slack – or cash at hand – when a crisis strikes gives firms a considerable advantage in both 
the short and longer term. A study by La Rocca et al. (2019), who examine how cash holdings 
affected performance in European SMEs, supports these results. Lee (2015), in a study of Korean 
firms, suggests that the relationship between financial slack and innovation is the strongest in 
younger and smaller firms. The implication is that the financial position of firms pre-crisis will 
influence longer term outcomes, particularly among SMEs.
After the worst of the COVID-19 crisis has passed, firms with greater financial slack may also 
be able to undertake different types of (more radical and risky) innovation than more financially 
constrained firms. Latham and Braun (2008) show how managers use financial slack to speedily 
implement firm strategy and accelerate recovery. Bruneel et al. (2016) show that firms with higher 
levels of financial slack are inclined to undertake explorative knowledge sourcing (distant search 
efforts with universities), the basis for radical innovation, whereas firms with low levels of slack 
are more inclined to undertake exploitative (near-term support and problem-solving) knowledge 
sourcing and incremental innovation. Evidence from the GFC, although not specific to SMEs, also 
suggests that crisis effects on innovation will vary strongly between sectors and regions. For exam-
ple, Delgado et al. (2015) examine the part played in recovery by regional clusters in the United 
States, and suggest that strong clusters not only improve regional employment growth over time, 
but also improve the resilience of regional economies to downturns. Perhaps less obviously, cul-
tural factors may also play a part in shaping how strongly firms in different economies rebound 
after a crisis. For example, Petrakis et al. (2015) examine whether changes in innovation and com-
petitive performance in 24 European countries during and after the GFC (2008–2013) were due to 
the macro conditions at the time or more long-lasting forces such as the economy’s cultural back-
ground. Their data imply the existence of two clusters of countries: First, an anti-innovation cluster 
where there is a reluctance to invest in and use new technologies and where there is a low level of 
interpersonal trust. Second, a pro-innovation cluster where firms feel safe and tend to take risks. 
Regression analysis suggests that an economy that has or is developing a pro-innovation culture is 
able to perform better in the future, despite adverse international conditions.
The evidence suggests that firms which are able to sustain their innovation activity will gain a 
significant advantage in any post-COVID recovery. For example, Flammer and Ioannou (2015) 
use regression analysis to investigate how US firms adjusted their investments into key resources 
– both tangible and intangible – during the GFC (2007–2009). Firms that continued to invest in 
R&D and innovation by (1) becoming more efficient and innovative, (2) adapting more easily to 
shifting needs and demands of suppliers, consumers and other stakeholders, and (3) enhancing 
their organisational resilience, were able to sustain competitiveness. This is confirmed by 
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European evidence provided by Spescha and Woerter (2019), who suggest that non-innovative 
firms suffered the most significant losses during the economic crisis. R&D-based innovations, 
which may be more radical than non-R&D-based innovations, generating products or services of 
a greater innovation depth, also provide stronger insulation against economic crises (Laursen and 
Salter, 2006): firms that undertake R&D-based innovation experience more stable growth devel-
opment than non-R&D innovators. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that previous inno-
vation experience during periods of recession strengthens a firm’s ability to invest in R&D during 
a new crisis (Amore, 2015). In an empirical analysis of US firm data spanning the 1980s, 1990s 
and early 2000s (a period that includes three downturns in the US economy), Amore (2015) finds 
that innovative behaviour during the early 1980s recession had a significant, positive effect on 
R&D investment during subsequent recessions. These findings may suggest the presence of 
organisational learning, with firms following previous recession innovation strategies when a new 
crisis occurs (Audia et al., 2000; Boeker, 1997).
Sustaining innovation during a crisis may be more difficult in smaller firms which may be hard-
est hit by post-crisis liquidity constraints. However, where it is possible, the evidence suggests that 
SMEs benefit significantly from R&D and innovation investments, both in terms of survival and 
profitability. For example, Jung et al. (2018) use data for 588 Korean manufacturing SMEs during 
the 2008–2014 period, to examine whether undertaking R&D investment increases the probability 
of firm survival during a recession. Results suggest that technologically capable SMEs can increase 
their chance of survival by investing in R&D and innovation. Castillejo et al. (2019) examine the 
effectiveness of innovation and internationalisation strategies among Spanish SMEs during the 
GFC. Both strategies are key determinants of firm performance, and results indicate that mark-ups 
are larger at the beginning of the GFC for SMEs undertaking R&D or SMEs engaging in both R&D 
and exporting activities.
UK support for R&D and innovation
UK government attention during the GFC focused primarily on maintaining the integrity of the 
banking sector, although many smaller firms still experienced significant borrowing constraints. 
This inevitably influenced liquidity and a firm’s willingness to invest in R&D and innovation. The 
UK government’s austerity measures and moves to centralise the then regionalised structure of 
business support in the United Kingdom also meant that few specific measures were implemented 
to directly support R&D and innovation after the GFC. One important exception was the develop-
ment of the Catapult network of technology intermediaries, which has grown and developed sig-
nificantly over the past decade.3 Other measures such as R&D tax credits have also become 
significantly more important in the United Kingdom since the GFC. As part of its response to the 
COVID-19 crisis, the UK government put in place significant measures to support UK businesses 
including a furlough scheme to support employment during the lock-down and a range of guaran-
teed business loans. Despite these very significant measures, the impact of lock-down on firm 
liquidity and financial reserves has been substantial. The implication of previous research empha-
sising the procyclicality of R&D and innovation investment and the UK trends analysis reported 
earlier is that this liquidity crisis will significantly impact on the R&D and innovation spending of 
firms. A recent survey of holders of UK government R&D and innovation grants, for example, 
suggested that around a third of firms were planning to cut their R&D spending by more than 50% 
over the next three months. These short-term cuts will have longer term consequences for levels of 
innovation, growth, profitability and resilience.
The UK government has published an R&D roadmap intended to set strategic guidelines for 
supporting R&D and innovation post-COVID. This reaffirms the ambition to raise R&D spending 
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to 2.4% of gross domestic product (GDP) by 2027. This target looks all the more challenging given 
the likely effects of COVID-19 on business R&D and innovation spend. However, supporting 
R&D and innovation has been central to the UK government’s and the European Union (EU) 
response to the COVID-19 pandemic.4 In the United Kingdom, the importance of R&D innovation 
to future recovery has been recognised in the announcement of a £1.5 billion loan and grant pack-
age for the United Kingdom’s most innovative companies.5 Fast-growing, equity-backed firms will 
be able to access matched loan funding, while firms already in receipt of Innovate UK funding will 
be able to access additional loan and grant finance. A group of 1200 other innovating firms will 
also be able to access additional funding. The evidence suggests that both the UK government’s 
general measures to support liquidity and these targeted innovation supports will help to offset 
anticipated falls in R&D and innovation in 2021. Whether these measures will be sufficient to 
offset the procylicality of R&D and innovation decisions in the United Kingdom and move us 
closer to the long-term target, however, only time will tell.
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1. A more detailed analysis of innovation trends in the United Kingdom after the great financial crisis 
(GFC) can be found in Roper (2020).
2. Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Office for National Statistics, Northern Ireland. 
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